

NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT DIVISIONS: STATE MILITIA OR FEDERAL MUSCLE FORCE STRUCTURE MIX

**A MONOGRAPH
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Infantry**



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ABSTRACT

THE NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT DIVISIONS: STATE MILITIA OR FEDERAL MUSCLE? FORCE STRUCTURE MIX by MAJ Thomas L. Rousseau, 63 pages.

This monograph examines the current force structure of the Bottom-Up Review and its ability to meet the requirements as outlined in the National Military Strategy. The goals and objectives of the national U.S. strategy are examined in the context of the two MRC scenario as described in the National Military Strategy. Cold War logic has had a significant impact on the framers of the National Military Strategy and the Bottom-Up Review force reflects this influence. The two MRC scenario "sizing function" has left the U.S. military with a smaller, more lethal, but probably irrelevant force in the post-Cold War environment.

The monograph traces the historic roots of the modern-day National Guard and discusses the inherent tensions built into the U.S. Constitution between the federal and state forces. From the *Federalist Papers* to the current "Off-Site" agreement, the evolution of the Guard and the legal framework that it works within are discussed. A detail analysis of the current force structure highlights the shortages in Contingency Force Pool support personnel to support the two MRC scenario. Several case studies examine the Guard's ability to meet both its state and federal missions. This is followed by an in-depth look at the current force structure, specifically the relevance of the eight National Guard combat divisions to the total force as organized. The monograph culminates with an evaluation of the National Military Strategy and the potential changes that the current Quadrennial Review could make toward future force structure.

Finally, the monograph concludes with two basic recommendations: Either change the National Military Strategy's goals and objectives, or change the force structure to meet the current goals and objectives. The goals and objectives of the National Military Strategy set the conditions for determining the force structure. Theoretically, the force structure should be able to satisfy requirements set forth in the National Military Strategy. If the Quadrennial Review retains the logic from previous studies, then the force structure needs to change to satisfy the National Military Strategy. This monograph concludes that the eight National Guard combat divisions should be converted into CS and CSS-type units.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I fear that we are involved in a rationalization process based on the illusionary notion that technological advances can be decisively applied to nearly all military and political affairs. This approach is no more valid today than it has been in the past.

-General (Ret.) Gordon R. Sullivan¹

The National Military Strategy and the Army force structure have undergone rapid changes since the 1980s. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the "Iron Curtain" has signaled the beginning of the "new world order" (defined as a future that is without the specter of imminent superpower conflict.)² In the spring of 1989, the Joint Staff initiated a Force Structure/Force Mix called the "Quiet Study." This study's purpose was to assess the changing strategic environment and its impact on the defense establishment and resulted in the force structure outlined in the "Base Force". The results from this Department of Defense internal study was highly suspect and criticized by members of congress for not reflecting reality.³

The next study initiated in 1993, called the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), used a "sizing function" to determine force structure. Again, members of Congress felt that the Department of Defense (DOD) did not establish a proper base-line to evaluate the strategic threat to America's national interests. Senator Joe Lieberman echoed these sentiments by attaching an amendment to the 1997 defense authorization bill requiring DOD to conduct strategic review every four years called the Quadrennial Review (QDR).

In a speech from the floor of the senate, Senator Lieberman highlighted the turbulent times facing the nation; and in particular the Defense Department:

“There’s no shortage of threats to our national interest. Rogue states like Iran, Iraq and North Korea. The more profound, longer range and potential emergence of a new superpower, perhaps a nationalistic Russia; perhaps China. Those are the possibilities we must factor in. There is also the more immediate threat of terrorism, and the terrorists’ potential acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. We’ve got to conclude that the world is not as predictable as it once was.”⁴

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been two official recommendations for restructuring the US military with a third currently on-going. In both studies, the “Base Force” and the “Bottom-Up Review,” the emphasis is on the strategic capability of the US military to fight and win two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs).⁵ This arbitrary sizing function drastically reduced the total force. This reduction in force structure in both the active and reserve components placed a strenuous demand on the combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units ability to meet adequately the needs of the combat elements.

Identifying and resourcing this shortfall in CS and CSS units is the challenge for force designers. In *Operation Desert Storm*, the first call-up of reserves in more than two decades, the Army deployed some 70,000 guardsmen and reservists.⁶ Since this successful deployment, the Army force structure has decreased from twenty-eight divisions (eighteen active and ten reserve) to eighteen divisions (ten active and eight reserve)⁷. With the new force structure, can the Army successfully meet the support requirements for fighting and winning two MRCs as outlined under the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review?⁸ The current National Guard structure may hold the key to this dilemma.

This monograph will answer the question as to the feasibility of converting excess National Guard force structure; specifically the eight combat divisions, into CS and CSS type organizations. A short historical review of the constitutionality for the existence of the National Guard will provide the legality framework and political considerations for discussing the reorganization of the National Guard. Following this analysis, a brief review of the Guard operating in their state role followed by recent incidents of the Guard in a federal status will highlight the competing requirements for the Guard's limited capabilities. A detailed analysis of the National Military Strategy and the BUR force operating in a two MRC scenario will demonstrate the need for a reorganization of the combat heavy National Guard force structure. A brief threat analysis followed by a short doctrinal review will highlight the inconsistencies of the current force structure. Finally, the monograph will conclude with an assessment of the research question.

Background:

The roots of the Militia (precursor to the National Guard) are imbedded deep in the US Constitution. In Articles I and II, the framers of the Constitution codified the principle of civilian control over the military by giving the Congress the power to "raise and support" a standing army. The innate fear that the early leaders had toward large standing armies was evident in the verbiage they wrote into the constitution that placed a fiscal "string" on such an army: "...but no appropriation of money to that use shall be longer than two years."⁹ The reliance on the militia versus a large standing army to protect the nation placed competing demands on this loosely organized state level force.

The organizational structure of the National Guard is not necessarily the most efficient or effective force to accomplish the sometimes competing state and federal roles. Natural disasters such as the Midwest flooding to Hurricane Andrew provides ample discussion of organization and equipment best suited for a state level force. Countering the need to satisfy state emergencies are the unique capabilities required for operations like Haiti, Somali and Bosnia. Balancing these issues is the current BUR force structure designed to fight and win two nearly simultaneous MRCs.

The BUR force is the basis for the Pentagon's planning, programming, and budgeting for the foreseeable future and as such it is currently under fire from several directions.¹⁰ One characterization of the BUR force is that it is too costly and grossly misrepresents the current threat in the world today. The opposite point of view finds the BUR force barely adequate to meet the challenges of a chaotic environment.¹¹ The expected release of the nonpartisan National Defense Panel recommendations to the QDR in May 1997 will probably reduce the BUR force and significantly alter the debate surrounding the two MRC scenario.¹²

Determining the threat is critical to developing a force structure. Although the two MRC scenario may not be correct, it does provide a stable planning focus to allocate resources and determining requirements. New technology is revolutionizing the manner in which warfare is waged. Numerous third world countries are able to fill the void vacated by the former Soviet Union. These nations will influence the debate concerning the two MRC scenario. The current force structure may lack the flexibility to meet both the

unorthodox threats found in many third world countries and the more conventional ones from nations like China or North Korea.

This monograph postulates that the current force structure lacks adequate CS and CSS force structure to prosecute properly a nearly two MRC scenario, and may even lack key support forces to accomplish several smaller limited regional contingencies. The emergence of new and possibly deadlier threats will continue to challenge the two MRC scenario. Determination of the threat is critical for force design. Once the planning base is established, then force structure can solidify.

Assumptions:

To assess the feasibility of converting “X” number of National Guard divisions to CS and CSS type organizations, several assumptions concerning the reliability of the BUR force and two MRC scenario must be made. First, the Quadrennial Review is leaning toward cuts in the current force structure (albeit not as drastic as some experts predict). The loss of a division equivalent or less is expected, with possibly a restructuring of the training base to keep the ten active divisions intact. Next, the premise that the two MRC war scenario will remain in effect. For planning purposes, the strategy of holding in one theater while winning in another is valid. A detail analysis concerning this assumption and its implication on future force structure is discussed in a later chapter. Finally, a shift in missions from the active component into the reserves as a result of the force structure change will occur.

Current Force Structure:

Table 1.1¹³ depicts the current Active, Reserve and National Guard force

structure. The break down highlights the total authorized strength by TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment, TDA (Table of Distribution and Allowances), CS and CSS type units and TTHS account (Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students). The end-strengths are based on the Bottom-Up Review. The Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) does not count TTHS as a separate entry. Soldiers on temporary duty or not present for duty for any other reason are still counted against the unit's strength. Table 1.1 highlights the contingency force pool (CFP) of support units available for deployment to conduct support operations at echelons above division and corps (EAD and EAC).

Force Structure—"The Bottom-Up Review"				
UNIT	ACTIVE	ARNG	USAR	TOTAL
TOE units	311,300	335,900	152,000	799,200
Combat units	184,900	174,600	0	359,500
Enhanced Bdes		64,500		64,500
8 Cbt. Divisions		110,100		110,100
EAD & EAC units	126,400	97,900	91,000	315,300
Fwd presence	47,600			47,600
CONUS	78,800			78,800
CFP	77,600	60,200	53,500	191,300*
Special Ops force		3,200	7,500	10,700
TDA organizations	123,900	31,100	56,000	211,000
TTHS	59,800	0	0	59,800
TOTAL:	495,000	367,000	208,000	1,070,000

Table 1.1

* Total Contingency Support Pool available to support CINC's war plans

The focus for this monograph is on the CS and CSS units which make-up the contingency force pool (CFP). Under the strategy proposed by the BUR, the CFP constitutes the pool of units from which support units for a contingency operation would

be drawn. This pool is primarily made-up of active component forces at the initial stages of the operation, than quickly expands to mostly reserve components. The pool concept replaced the Capstone program, which had aligned support units in accordance with an operation's plan allocation and wartime chain of command.¹⁴ The CFP pool of 191,300 is the optimal number of support forces that could be available to meet the National Military Strategy's requirement to conduct two nearly simultaneous MRCs. This monograph will examine the feasibility of the CFP to meet this requirement.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

We should remember that our nation's wars have always been fought successfully by citizen soldiers, not praetorian guards or elite units.

-Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, Jr.¹⁵

The concept of the citizen-soldier predates the Guard as we know it by hundreds of years. In 1027 Saxon England, prior to the Norman conquests at Hastings, it was the duty of every able-bodied man to serve in the "fyrd," or militia, to defend their homeland.¹⁶ The "call to arms" of the citizen-soldier has its roots planted deeply into the American culture as well. Since 1636, when the first militia units organized in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the National Guard has fought in every American war from the *Pequot war* of 1637 to *Operation Desert Storm*.¹⁷ In the last 100 years, the citizen-soldier has provided the bulk of the combat elements in four of the last five major conflicts.¹⁸

This long standing tradition of reliance upon the "citizen-soldier" is key in any discussion concerning the capabilities and roles of the National Guard. This link between the Guard and the American public provides the fundamental philosophy surrounding its existence in an age where technology demands full-time, highly professional operators. The historical background provides relevant insights into the purpose and function of the National Guard as it relates to the political and legal structure as set forth in the US Constitution.

The Federalist Papers Influence:

The United States, a fledgling new republic, had just finished a major conflict to over-throw a despotic government that represented everything they despised; tyrannical leadership (a king) with ruthless power (a large standing army). At the time of the American Revolution, the European continent was embroiled in conflict. Large standing armies allowed kings and emperors to subjugate their neighbors. Americans were fearful that a large standing army would dissolve the rights and liberties they had fought so hard to achieve. *The Federalist Papers*, a critical piece of literary work published in the form of letters to newspapers, was a vehicle to help promote the newly penned document call the US Constitution. *The Federalist Papers* did little to change public opinion surrounding the Articles of Confederation, but rather supplied them with an authoritative interpretation of the Constitution once it was adopted.¹⁹ A key contributor to *The Federalist Papers* was Alexander Hamilton.

In *Federalist 24* Hamilton argues the merits for a standing army: "The militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty [referring to garrisoning the western frontier against Indians] in time of profound peace."²⁰ The significance of this argument is that it lays the groundwork for delineating roles between the active and reserve components. Hamilton understands the importance of the militia in time of state and national emergencies, but he also saw the need for a standing army to secure America's position on the world scene.

The potential threat from abroad also compelled Hamilton to stress the need for a common defense in *Federalist 25*: "The Territories of Britain, Spain and of the Indian

nations in our neighbourhood, do not border on any particular States; but incircle the Union from Maine to Georgia.”²¹ The concept of a common defense provided the seeds for the growth of the future professional army. The fear from abroad and the distrust of large and powerful states consolidating their position in the newly formed federal government tilted public opinion toward a standing army, albeit small, under federal control. For the “antifederalists,” like Eldbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, they felt that the newly formed government took away too much power from the individual states.²²

The Federalist Papers contributed to the passage of the Articles of Confederation and provided popular interpretation of the Articles that helped form the basis for constitutional law.²³ The debates surrounding the establishment of a standing army were codified in the Constitution and a subsequent amendment assured the existence of the National Guard.

The Constitutional “Charter” of the Guard:

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution contain several “militia clauses” that vested the distinct authority over the National Guard in the federal government and in the state governments. A basic function for Congress is to “raise and support Armies” and “provide and maintain a Navy.” The 14th clause gave the Congress three constitutional grounds “for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.”²⁴ The addition of the first ten amendments in the so-called “Bill of Rights” attempted to calm the fears of the opponents of the Constitution in its original form.

The second amendment of the Bill of Rights codified the militia into law to prevent the federal government from disbanding the Guard. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,...shall not be infringed."²⁵ From a constitutional standpoint, the legal status of the Guard ensures its existence as long as the Constitution remains in effect. The passage of several Acts strengthened the Guard's roles.

The actual organizational structure of the National Guard evolved from the *Militia Act* of 1792. This act remained in effect for 111 years. The *Militia Act* defines the relationship between the militia and federal government. The premise for national defense envisioned a small professional army supported by a well-armed militia. This arrangement remained in effect until the passage of the *Dick Act* (known as the *National Defense Act* of 1903). The *Dick Act* and the 1916 *National Defense Act* expanded the role of the Guard as the primary reserve force and established the term "National Guard" for that force. These acts also expanded the use of the Guard for federal emergencies at the discretion of the President. Several amendments to the *Dick Act* in the 1920s and the *National Guard Act* of 1933 created the National Guard as a component of the Army and shaped the current Guard organization.²⁶ The Constitution and subsequent Acts defined the National Guard, but they also established potential conflicts.

Inherently built into the Constitution was the potential for cooperation and tension between the militia and the army. Article IV, Section 4 provides for the intervention of the federal forces into state emergencies at the local Governor's request. The *Dick Act* allowed for a greater expansion of the Guard at the federal level while Article IV had the potential to diminish the requirement for a "well-regulated militia" to provide for states'

security. The Civil War and the Reconstruction of the South witnessed an unprecedented intervention into civilian affairs by federal forces. To rein in the military's threat to local civilian control, Congress passed the *Posse Comitatus Act* of 1878.

The *Posse Comitatus Act* stated that "it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States...for the purpose of executing the laws, except on such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by any act of Congress..."²⁷ To demonstrate the effectiveness of the *Posse Comitatus Act*, statistics on Guard activity during the recent Los Angeles riots provide a vivid analysis. Before being federalized during the Los Angeles riots, the National Guard accepted 167 missions. After federalization, the *Posse Comitatus Act* limited the Guard to accepting only 10% (16 of 167) of those missions.²⁸

The balance between federal and state level forces has been a point of contention since the introduction of the Articles of Confederation. Prior amendments and acts have refined and solidified the Guard's role in both state and federal affairs affecting national security. The blurring of roles and missions between the two forces could lead to serious problems in protecting America's security both abroad and internally. The over-reliance on using federal forces for state level responsibilities could diminish the effectiveness of the *Posse Comitatus* and provide the wrong focus for the Army.

Focusing the Guard on only internal affairs would spell disaster for the planners attempting to achieve the stated goals in the National Military Strategy. The reliance on the Guard to provide support and combat forces to help achieve the goals and objectives

in the National Military Strategy is critical. A closer analysis of the reserve's requirement to support the CFP will demonstrate this point.

CHAPTER 3

CONTINGENCY FORCE POOL

The General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted an in-depth review of the DOD's Bottom-Up Review in 1994. In the process, it looked at the Army's contingency force pool concept. A similar report conducted by the RAND corporation validates most of the conclusions found in the GAO study and also examined the CFP Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) shortages in depth as they related to different simulation models. The GAO report used the two MRC scenario to evaluate the Army's support requirements. Several of the GAO findings may indicate a significant change in organizational structure to support future operations.

First, GAO found that there already exists a delta in the availability of support units before the drawdown of the 12 division "Base Force." The 10 division force under the BUR increases the delta because both the support and combat elements received identical reductions in percentage. If the ratio of support to combat forces are greater, then it stands to reason that the reduction of combat forces should be greater than support forces. In an earlier Total Army Analysis of support requirements for a 12 division force, the Army fell short by almost 838 support units. In a 10 division force, this shortfall is 654 units.²⁹

The second important finding by the GAO is that the shortfall of critical MOSs will exasperate the support issue. In five MOSs there is a combine shortfall of 206 support units (engineers - 33 units, medical - 84 units, quartermaster - 20 units, military police - 40 units and transportation - 29 units).³⁰ The conversion of any future National Guard assets

into support elements must address the deficiencies found within MOS make-up of support forces. A subsequent RAND study completed in 1995 provided a more detailed analysis of this GAO report and its findings.

RAND Study:

The RAND study evaluated the CFP in support of the BUR's MRC strategy from a single to two MRC scenario. Figure 3.1 highlights the shortage of the CFP personnel to support a reinforced MRC scenario.³¹ The total CFP personnel available is approximately 195,000 leaving a 100,000 shortfall. Table 1.1 reflected the total force structure and highlighted the CFP support personnel available in the total force. Almost 100% of the active component available support forces are currently in the CFP. The bulk of the additional support forces is in the reserves. The issue is with the amount of time these low priority support units will take to deploy, and the shortages of key military occupational specialties (MOS). These "general war" support forces do not receive adequate money for modernization nor do they train to the standard required to ensure their deployability is at or near C-day level (C-day equals day deployment operations commence). If the mobilization day (M-day) is after the C-day then the greater the reliance is on the active component forces. General war support pool of forces can deploy about as fast as the current eight combat divisions.³²

This analysis postulates that delaying M-day by as much as 20 days, as in the case of *Operation Desert Storm*, the greater the requirement is for active component support forces. This has significant impact for planning for a contingency. Support forces to actual combat forces are approximately 2.5:1. Using the Army's simulation model called

Force Analysis Simulation of Theater Administrative and Logistical Support (FASTALS), the RAND study concluded that it would require approximately 180,000 support forces for a MRC requiring approximately 73,000 combat forces (a four division force).³³ Delaying M-day by 20 days would require the active component to provide 110,000 support forces' versus slightly less than 40,000 (recalling that there are only 76,000 CFP forces available in the active component). With the proper management of call-up of reserves, the Army should be able to handle a modest single MRC. A different issue arises if the conflict increases in intensity--shortages of critical MOSs throughout the CFP will hinder operations.





Figure 3.1- Is the CFP adequate for a reinforced scenario?

Like the GAO report, this study found four critical MOSs that are potentially “show stoppers” in the prosecution of a reinforced MRC or two nearly MRCs—Military Intelligence, Quartermaster, Military Police, and Transportation personnel (Figure 3-2).

The CFP is able to meet the bare minimum requirements early in the conflict. For example, at day M+150, the requirement for the MOS transportation almost triples the total available transportation personnel in the CFP.³⁴ Any future conflict of the *Desert Storm* magnitude will easily exceed the 150-day duration (the *Desert Storm* build-up required nearly six months to complete). Future conversion of Guard combat units into CS and CSS type units will need to be sensitive to critical MOS shortages. The combat elements in the above MRC example experienced fewer manpower problems as found in the logistics arena of the CFP.



The RAND study that evaluated the CFP against a single, reinforced, and multiple MRC scenarios, found that there are adequate combat elements to meet these requirements. The flow of forces into theater required only active component forces for a single MRC, and the 15 enhanced brigades became necessary as the requirements increased from a single MRC to multiple ones.³⁵ This data points to one glaring

conclusion: the reserve components will increase their involvement in any future contingency of the magnitude of an *Operation Desert Storm*. Former Secretary of Defense, Dr. William Perry, summed-up these sentiments in a speech before the Adjutants General Association of the United States: "...we need to involve the Guard and Reserve more deeply in the ongoing missions of our military."³⁶

Is the Guard capable of responding to the Secretary's challenge? Without some change in the organizational structure of the Guard the short answer is probably no. A closer examination of the Guard's state and federal roles and missions will highlight the problems of using the Guard in a federal status and the shortcomings that the Guard exhibits responding to state emergencies.

CHAPTER 4

ROLES AND MISSIONS: - STATE AND FEDERAL

Our domestic missions—state disaster response, youth programs, counterdrug support—all contribute to maintaining economic and social strength for our nation.

-Lieutenant General Edward D. Baca, Chief, NGB³⁷

The National Guard's state mission is to provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise required by state law. Its primary federal mission is to "maintain properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency or as otherwise needed."³⁸ These dual mission statements have made the Guard almost schizophrenic in its search for identity and legitimacy in the defense establishment. Regardless of the Guard's persona, it will receive greater emphasis in any future debate concerning national interests—during both internal and external emergencies. The internal function of the Guard is its ability to respond to domestic emergencies. Its external function is the Guard's ability to act as a force that not only supports but even leads on occasion during federal emergencies. Let us begin with the more common role associated with the Guard—domestic disturbances.

I. State Role:

The Guard has provided state Governor's the flexibility to augment state agencies in times of domestic crisis. Domestic disturbances have highlighted the Guard's role as envisioned by the 14th Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The Guard's role in domestic disturbances is not a new phenomenon. The Guard has been performing domestic operations since the *Whiskey Rebellion of 1794*. During this domestic uprising,

or “insurrection,” the people of Pennsylvania refused to pay the tax on liquor and turned their anger into a riot. The quelling of the *Whiskey Rebellion* inaugurated the Guard's role in internal affairs.³⁹

Domestic Disturbances:

Civil disturbances claimed the majority of the Guard's attention during the turbulent 60's. Between the racial and war protesters, the Guard responded to over 330 call-ups involving over 390,802 reservists.⁴⁰ The sheer volume of call-ups and the presence of armed citizen-soldiers on the streets of America had a “desensitizing” effect on the general public. The manner in which the Guard responded to those disturbances shaped the public's opinion surrounding the effectiveness of the Guard. Two episodes in the Guard's history, the racial integration of the University of Alabama and the “anti-war” protests at Kent State, highlight the Guard's capabilities to perform in domestic disturbances.

In the racially heated debates of the 60's, the Alabama Guardsmen responded to 12 different call-ups, and on three of those incidents, the entire 16,463 Alabama National Guard responded to major disorders.⁴¹ The Guard moved to protecting the “freedom riders” in 1961 and escorting bus caravans after blacks were set upon by “Klan thugs and rednecks,” as referred to by Alabama's MG Henry V. Graham labeled them.⁴² The most memorable incident in the Alabama Guard's history occurred on the footsteps of the University of Alabama.

The Governor of Alabama, George Wallace, became the focus of the domestic disturbance by his actions when he blocked the enrollment of black students into the

University of Alabama. His conduct was in direct violation of federal law and placed the Guard commander on the horns of a dilemma. In this incident, Article I, Section 8 came in direct conflict with Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution. The former article, directs Congress to call out the Guard in case of insurrection, the latter article directs the federal government to protect the states "against domestic violence" at the state's request.⁴³ If the Governor, the *de facto* commander of the Guard, does not request federal assistance, then how can the federal government circumvent this state right protected in the Constitution? When in federal service, MG Graham's chain-of-command changed from Wallace to then president, John F. Kennedy. This potential "powder keg" was easily diffused by disciplined Guardsmen following their responsibilities as outlined under the Constitution. However, not every Guard call-up reflected favorably on the Guard.

The Kent State incident showcased a Guard that was unprepared to handle a mission that far exceeded its capabilities. A hastily thrown together Guard force quickly found itself surrounded by screaming, rock-throwing "anti-war" protesters at Kent State. These untrained Guardsmen fired an uncoordinated volley that killed four students and wounded several others. The association of the word "untrained" to the Guard is appropriate because soldier manuals are devoid of law enforcement techniques specifically aimed at quelling civilian disturbances. Granted, these individuals were under enormous stress and fearful for their lives, but properly trained policemen handle these situations on numerous occasions and with less bloodshed. Placing blame on the riotous students for the tragic incident at Kent State is wrong.⁴⁴ Untrained Guardsmen in the unfamiliar role of civilian disturbance is a more accurate description of the events.

The training and equipping the Guard for both its domestic and federal missions may seem at odds. An infantry company or armor battalion does not possess the proper law enforcement equipment or training to execute civilian disturbance missions. The Common Task Training and Soldier Manuals do not include riot control tasks. These tasks are largely “ad-hoc” and trained only when the need arises. The above organizations provide enough manpower to execute the mission of civilian disturbance, but lack the professional training. The Los Angeles Riots highlights this point.

Los Angeles Riots:

The LA Riots in April 1992 provide a vivid example of the Guard performing a domestic mission as envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. The National Security Strategy classifies organized crime and lawlessness a threat to global peace and freedom, and undermines democracies.⁴⁵ The riots that caused \$717 million in damage and caused 54 deaths and 2,383 injuries, epitomized the lawlessness and criminal activity as espoused in the National Security Strategy.⁴⁶ The initial response to this calamity was to call out the California National Guard (CNG) to augment the Los Angeles police department.

The CNG mobilized the 40th Infantry Division (M)(-) to provide the security and manpower to restore order. A total of 10,465 Guard soldiers were eventually mobilized. Several political struggles developed between the Mayor and Chief of Police, and between the Governor and the state Adjutant General. This confusing and uncooperative arrangement between the key players resulted in a delay in deploying the Guard onto the streets and a logistical nightmare in issuing ammunition and riot control gear. This

perceived ineffectiveness of the CNG pressed the Governor to ask the President for federal assistance without consulting his military leadership.⁴⁷

Responding to this request, the President federalized the deployed troops of the CNG and created a Joint Task Force (JTF-LA). The task force consisted of 3,500 active army, 11,500 marines and corpsmen, but more importantly it placed a federal officer in charge of all forces in theater. The bulk of all solders deployed were combat forces, predominantly infantry and armor. Table 4.1 depicts the organizational structure operating in and around the Los Angeles area as part of JTF-LA.⁴⁸

California National Guard		Active Component—JTF-LA	
40th Division (-)	Air National Guard	7th Infantry Div. (-)	MAG-TF
3 Bdes(5 IN, 4 AR Bns)	Airlift Wing (C130)	MP Co.	1 IN Bn
MP Bde (2 Bns)	Rescue Grp	Aviation elements	1 LT AR Bn
Div. Artillery (3 Bns)	Recon Grp	1 Bde (3 IN Bns)	MP Co/Eng elements
Spt Cmd (3 Bns)	Fighter wing	Spt Cmd (1 Bn)	MAG elements

Table 4. 1

A quick glance at the above table clearly depicts the lack of trained personnel to function in a law enforcement manner. The common task training and individual and collective training manuals focus on warfighting skills with little or no emphasis on quelling civil disturbances. Of the 15 National Guard battalions available to conduct police related functions, only two had any formal training in law enforcement functions. The active component provided only a single military police company. The Los Angeles police department was hesitant to employ National Guard soldiers and the Governor

questioned the Guard's effectiveness and ability to deploy in time to impact on the deteriorating situation⁴⁹

Whatever the reasons for the National Guard's slow response to the situation, the CNG may not have possessed right mix of force structure to provide the city with adequate support. While armor and field artillery battalions may be extremely effective in a "combat-in-cities" scenario, the LA Riots were fueled more by criminal activity under the auspices of the Rodney King verdict than by actual combat. The military's ability to enforce civilian laws have constitutional and ethical ramifications they can hamper its effectiveness as a law enforcement agency.

The *Posse Comitatus Act* limits the federal military force from active involvement in law enforcement. As discussed earlier, this act does not affect the national Guard when they are under state control. This "legal" advantage over the federal force should prevent a Governor from ever asking the President to federalize his troops. The case in the LA Riots is significant because it highlights local leaders' confidence in their state militia to satisfactory meet state needs. Organizational structure and questionable leadership prevented the CNG from impacting quickly on this state emergency.

Natural Disasters:

The Guard is a flexible tool that is readily available to assist states in local emergencies from the Midwest floods to Hurricane Andrew. The make-up of the Guard to perform these common events is appropriate. Filling sandbags in the Midwest to prevent flooding, or picking up tons of debris left over from Hurricane Andrew require little training and hard labor. A RAND study conducted for the National Defense

Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994 reported that in fiscal year 1993 the National Guard conducted over 460,000 duty days in a federal status. This represented 6% of the Guard's total compacity with over 50% of those days used during the Midwest flooding. This does not include federal augmentation.⁵⁰

The use of federal forces to augment the state's capabilities to meet the demands of such horrific catastrophes highlights short-comings in Guard organizational structure. During Hurricane Andrew over 50% of the Florida Guard responded to the state emergency. To assist in patrolling destroyed neighborhoods and to aid in recovery efforts, active duty soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division and specialized units like the 36th Engineers from Ft. Benning, Georgia provided special augmentation to the Floridian forces. Regardless of the organizational short-comings, the RAND study reported that, nationally, state demands on the Army and Air Guard are not significant. The Guard's own data does not show any sizable drain on personnel or resources to support state missions.⁵¹ The Guard is thus able to meet most state emergencies that require "low tech" solutions and are short of duration.

II. Federal Role:

Operation Desert Storm showcased the Guard's ability to fulfill its federal mission. This successful operation saw the activation of over 145,500 Selected Reservists and 22,000 additional reservists in 1,045 units. The National Guard sent 62,411 from 395 units.⁵² The Guard provided many types of support units—from water purification units that provided millions of gallons of fresh water to transportation units that moved more than five million gallons of fuel across the desert in support of the ground war—as part of

a much larger and capable total force.⁵³ The only significant blemish on this successful deployment involved the round-out brigades.

Center of the storm revolved around the activation and train-up of the Georgia 48th Brigade; the 24th Infantry Division's round-out 3rd Brigade. The ability of such units to meet the DOD 90-day deployment schedule is suspect. A previous RAND study indicates that most of the former "Round-Up" brigades (redesignated as the Enhanced Readiness Brigades) cannot meet the 90-day certification criteria and would require additional training days and resources to achieve that goal in any event.⁵⁴ The GAO report evaluating the BUR and the underlining DOD assumptions came to the same conclusion.⁵⁵ In response to these shortcomings, several changes have occurred since the 48th Brigade's activation.

In December 1993, a historic "Off-Site" agreement between senior leaders of the active Army, National Guard, Army Reserve and major organizations representing each component chose a restructuring plan to strengthen the readiness of the Army National Guard and reserve components. The most significant change was to move most of the combat units from the reserves into the Guard, and place most of the support type units under the reserves' control. This resulted in a National Guard possessing a significantly combat heavy force that is excess of the BUR force requirements. This fact, coupled with the reduction of reserve forces (predominately support units) left the Army woefully short in support units.

The BUR force may possess the wrong active and reserve component force structure mix. Shortages in support forces and an excess in combat forces could lead to

disasterous results for the DOD in its attempt to support the goals and objectives of the National Military Strategy. A closer examination of the BUR force structure and the threat will demonstrate the problems associated with designing a viable defense force. The logic behind the BUR and the future Quadrennial Review will enlighten the reader to the problems of developing a force using bad assumptions.

Chapter 5

FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW—AC/RC MIX

The Bottom-Up Review gave us 15 high-priority, enhanced brigades, but failed to define the balance of the force. The Off Site agreement validates the retention of at least an additional 22 combat arms brigades as a strategic reserve. We also achieved stability of Army Guard Flags.

Major General John L. Matthews, President, NGAUS⁵⁶

Bottom-Up Review:

The Bottom-Up Review is the Department of Defense's primary document used for planning, programming, and budgeting for the future. In October 1993 DOD released the Bottom-Up Review—an assessment of the US defense needs in the face of the post-Cold War environment.⁵⁷ The BUR document provided recommended force structure and strategy to meet the goals and objectives as outlined in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. Table 5.1 depicts the BUR force structure.⁵⁸

It is noteworthy that the GAO report does not include the eight National Guard divisions in table 5.1. The 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades are the only combat elements used in the planning assumptions for future contingencies. These forces are not associated with the eight National Guard combat divisions but rather have a habitual relationship with active component divisions. The Bottom-Up Review assigned a secondary mission to the eight National Guard divisions; serving as a deterrent hedge to future adversarial regimes. The Commission on Roles and Missions has questioned the size and legitimacy of such a mission.⁵⁹ The force structure identified is what DOD felt was adequate to meet a two-conflict strategy option while maintaining the flexibility to support overseas presence and accomplish smaller-scaled operations, such as Haiti or Somalia.⁶⁰ DOD made several

assumptions concerning the capabilities of the BUR force when determining the appropriate force structure. The planning and assessment that the DOD used contained several questionable assumptions.

DOD's Bottom-Up Review Force Structure	
Army	10 Active Divisions 15 Army National Guard enhanced readiness (combat) brigades
Navy	11 active aircraft carriers 1 reserve/training aircraft carrier 44 - 55 attack submarines 346 ships
Marine Corps	3 Marine expeditionary forces 174,000 active personnel 42,000 reserve personnel
Air Force	13 active fighter wings 7 reserve fighter wings Up to 184 bombers (B-52H, B-1, B-2)
Strategic nuclear forces	18 ballistic missile submarines Up to 94 B-52H bombers 29 B-2 bombers 500 Minutemen III Intercontinental ballistic missiles (single warhead)
Table 5.1	

The GAO report identified some of these questionable assumptions. First, the ability of the military to redeploy forces from one theater of operations to another relies on proposed enhancements in lift capabilities such as the C-17 transport and fast sealift. Second, can the National Guard's Enhanced Readiness Brigades meet the timeline for deployment? RAND Corporation study estimates that it will require atleast 130-days for post-mobilization to meet certification standards. This was bore out by the 48th Brigade's train-up in preparation for deployment during *Desert Storm*.⁶¹ Finally, the reliance on

enhanced firepower to offset the reductions in force structure to meet future conflicts can only be tested in theory.⁶²

The ability of the armed forces to shift troops from theater to theater in a timely basis are questionable. The mobility of our armed forces has greatly improved but there still remains serious lift shortages in both air and sea to meet even a modest conflict. Second, the improved capabilities of the *Force XXI* army are still questionable. Numerous exercises are on-going with the "Experimental Force," or EXFOR, at Ft. Hood Texas, but the enhanced capabilities advertised are still years away. Finally, the shortage of support forces highlighted by the above GAO statement poses a greater threat for accomplishing the goals and objectives of the BUR force.

Two MRC Scenario:

The "New World order" has left an ominous cloud over future defense budgets. When the Bottom-Up Review in 1993 recommended that we be able to fight two major regional conflicts on the magnitude of the Persian Gulf War, the additional burdens of international peace operations were not present. These operations have had a draining effect on the current support force structure and will continue to hamstring future large-scaled operations. If the support elements currently located overseas in Korea and Europe is unable for redeployment into another theater of operations the shortcoming in the overall support structure is exasperated (see Table 1.1). Budgetary influences and the fall of the only other true super-power have left the Defense Department struggling to meet the requirements outlined in the Bottom-Up Review. An easy fix is to change the threat analysis.

Currently, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Reimer, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Fogleman, differ on the national strategy that advocates the two MRC scenario. General Fogleman has proposed a "one and half" MRC strategy. He told defense writers on 7 January, 1997, that the "proliferation of peace operations since the end of the Cold War argues for a one and half MRC strategy that aims to win one major conflict, a smaller one elsewhere, and still have enough forces left over to handle two peacekeeping operations."⁶³ Fogleman's argument would suggest that a one and half MRC strategy would allow for deeper cuts in the current force structure with US Air Force bombers providing the deterrence necessary until the full defense force could be brought to bear.

The one irony in this argument is that as the Army scales down to meet a one and half MRC, the Air Force would most likely increase in size. Two areas of increase for the Air Force would be in lift capacity to move the smaller Army from peace operations to MRC and in the bomber fleet to offer a greater deterrence. The one and half MRC strategy highlights several significant issues. First, if the United States is engaging North Korea, could or would they be able to deter Iraqi aggression in the Middle East with the remaining reduced force pool. Second, even small peace operations are logistically intensive and would stress the limited support forces to the breaking point (see Figure 3.1).⁶⁴ Whether this is General Fogleman's agenda or it truly reflects the strategic environment, the Quadrennial Review will address this issue.

Quadrennial Review:

The Pentagon is currently conducting a top-to-bottom down review called the Quadrennial Review with the explicit purpose of reassessing the strategy for the turn of the century. Echoing the sentiments of numerous budget cutters, retired Admiral Leighton Smith, who led the multinational force into Bosnia, predicted that the review will result in cuts. "The bottom line is that we can expect to get smaller...We have to have a [military] structure that deals with the world as it is and not as we wish it to be."⁶⁵ Smith's statements infer that more "Bosnia-like" operations are going to occur, and the prudent planner would ensure that the force structure reflects these realities.

Like Smith, Fogleman advocates units specifically designed to conduct peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping forces may be smaller in the area of combat power, but they have proven themselves almost as logistical intensive as that required for combat operations. The duration of peacekeeping operations is usually significantly longer than a normal combat operation as evidenced by the current 18 month addition to the already executed 12 month "home-by-Christmas" policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As modern warfare trends continue to come to a rather quick end, such as the defeat of Iraq and the incursion into Panama, peacekeeping operations may have a longer lasting affect on a nations' resources.

The notion of peacekeeping operations defies the logic behind the results of the Bottom-Up Review—a force structure developed on the "Cold War" threat-based model. This "false" logic could dominate the current Quadrennial Review, thus accomplishing status quo: a smaller, highly lethal, but less useful and possibly irrelevant US armed

forces.⁶⁶ The threat-based logic provided a “sizing function” for the authors of the BUR. Instead of shaping the force structure against the former Soviet Union, the two MRC scenario provided the strategist a mark on the wall to size the current structure against. The Quadrennial Review has the ability to size the future force structure on the logic of “capabilities-based” verses the Cold-War threat based models.

The paradox of a force structure philosophy based on capabilities enmeshed in Cold-War logic can lead to a force woefully unprepared to meet national security interests. The essential question then becomes: What are the capabilities required to fight and win a one-and-half MRC scenario? If you shape the force to achieve this end, then you may find that the force is inadequate to meet the full spectrum of national security requirements. The smaller, highly lethal force may now be incapable of performing a future peacekeeping operation on the scale of a Bosnia, or have the force structure capable of responding to local emergencies such as the LA Riots. This logic sounds a lot like the Eisenhower policy of massive retaliation in order to reduce the armed forces to almost an irrelevant force.⁶⁷

Nearly a decade of experience since the fall of the Berlin Wall should allow the strategists working the QDR the ability to develop a logic that meets the current and future needs of the Army. Strategists must take care not to design a force to optimize America’s armed forces for only one “narrow band of strategic requirements.”⁶⁸ The QDR may determine that the two MRC scenario was truly “false logic” and recommend a force structure that can meet the national security strategy of “prevent-deter-win-support.” The end results may be a force structure that remains at its current end-strength

or slightly increased, but reorganized to meet the full gamut of national security requirements.

Threat:

The force structure of the Cold-War era had an easily definable threat. It was usually symmetrical to ours and employed naval, air, and land forces conventionally. The two MRC scenario discusses the likelihood of American forces being used against nations like Korea, Iraqi and Iran. These symmetrical-style foreign armies provide easily identifiable targets and objectives from which the “dead hand of Napoleon” can conduct operational art in search of the battle of annihilation.⁶⁹ Unfortunately, most of the present and future enemies of the United States are asymmetrical in nature possessing weapons of mass destruction.

As Senator Lieberman’s comments at the beginning of chapter 1 indicate, the threat is no longer as easy to identify. Terrorist and rogue nations threatening American interest through the potential acquisition of weapons of mass destruction will continue to challenge force planners. Secondly, the reemergence of a nationalistic Russia or an economically powerful communist China could challenge the US in the future both militarily and definitely economically. The lack of symmetry of future threats will determine future force structure. As the QDR struggles to define this elusive concept, strategist designing force structure to meet future national security requirements cannot be myopic in their thinking as the logic of the two MRC suggests.

Chapter 6

COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS

This new national military strategy, derived from the national security strategy and the defense framework outlined in the Bottom-Up Review, describes the critical role the Armed Forces will play in helping to achieve our Nation's objectives.

General John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁷⁰

The previous discussion identified a potential enigma facing the framers of the National Military Strategy. If the national strategy is to fight and win two MRCs, then the shortfall in support forces to meet adequately the requirements identified in the National Military Strategy must be addressed. Using this logic, then one of two possible solutions exist: either change the standard used to calculate the force structure or allocate more support forces from the pool of combat elements. The GAO and RAND study discussed earlier demonstrated that the BUR force lacked adequate support forces and had excess combat units to satisfy the two MRC scenario and other strategic requirements. A closer look at the BUR force highlights this dilemma.

The BUR Force

The Clinton Administration's \$1.3 trillion 5-year defense program released in September 1993 showcased the BUR force as the "blueprint for transitioning from a defense posture designed to counter a Soviet threat to one oriented toward the challenges emerging [in] the post-Cold War security environment."⁷¹ This statement is admirable, but the BUR force structure is more consistent with the structure designed to fight the

Cold War but only on a smaller scale. To many critics the BUR force is considered too expansive and fails to recognize the realities of the post-Cold War environment.

“Guns *and* Butter,” to paraphrase Hermann Göring’s infamous speech⁷², epitomizes the economic policies of many developed nations. The United States has followed social and defense policies that are in a constant struggle for the ever-decreasing government revenue. The issue is not whether DOD will become smaller, but by how much? Under the ruse of a changing strategic environment, leaders of both political parties are arguing for even deeper cuts in the defense spending. To say that the BUR force is more a product of budgetary constraint as opposed to strategic objectives and goals is probably a fair statement. America’s economy, fueling an obscene debt, is simply unable to afford much additional spending on defense. When the architects of the BUR force based end-strength on the two MRC scenario vice a “capability force,” it failed to design a force that reflected the strategic environment.

Why a two MRC scenario? The threat described by the BUR reflects a conventional or symmetrical battlefield. Except for certain interventions, the current conflict environments differ drastically from conventional operations. The recent US experience in Mogadishu, Haiti, and currently in Bosnia-Herzegovina, highlight the need for more unconventional or asymmetrical forces to secure US goals and security objectives abroad. Finally, nontraditional operations tend to be protracted in nature. This gives additional credence to the claims that the BUR force would have significant difficulty in meeting any additional requirements outside of the two MRC scenario.⁷³

Unless the objectives and goals of the National Military Strategy are modified, then the only logical solution is to change force structure.

The National Military Strategy

Critical to the National Military Strategy's thesis is the armed forces' ability to fight successfully and win two MRCs.⁷⁴ This sizing function allows force planners to determine what end-strength to allocate against the two MRC scenario. As the GAO and RAND study indicate, the total force falls woefully short in support forces and is critically short in certain MOSs such as transportation and quartermaster. The reliance on the CFP concept makes efficient use of limited forces, but the pool is quickly used up as the conflict expands in duration and commitment of combat forces increases. The example provided in figure 3-1 highlights the predicament facing the resource constrained CFP. The few active component CFP support forces are used up quickly, then the reliance on reserve forces becomes essential. Central to the two MRC scenario of U.S. strategy is its ability to rely on the reserve base to meet the shortcomings in the active component.

To meet the two MRC capability, the National Military Strategy relies on our Nation's ability to generate forces quickly. The National Military Strategy states that "as our first forces react to a major regional crisis, we will begin actions to ensure forces are ready to meet a second contingency should it arise."⁷⁵ Even if enough forces are generated from the reserves, the additional requirements in operations other than war, such as peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance, will drain resources. Both RAND and GAO highlight the lack of modernization and deployability within the non-CFP reserve forces. This lack of modernization and mobility of reserve forces will have a

dramatic impact on the military's ability to meet its requirements as outlined in the National Military Strategy.

As the total force nears its final drawdown level, the National Military Strategy is relying on "enhancements" and "modernization" of the total force as the panacea for a force that will potentially be outnumbered by many third-world nations.⁷⁶ The shortcoming in lift capability prevents the timely movement of forces from theater to theater as needed. Enhancements, such as the C-17 and roll-on/roll-off ships, are the equivalents of Antoine Jomini's interior lines. As defined by Jomini, "interior lines of operations are adopted by one or two armies to oppose several hostile bodies."⁷⁷ For a force projection military the concept of interior lines is no longer linear, but now take on a third dimension. As critical as interior lines were to armies in Jomini's time, they are just as important to the National Military Strategy's ability to handle a two MRC scenario. The lack of adequate lift jeopardizes this premise. To maximize the effects of the modernization and enhancement programs, the military must have the right balance of force structure to meet present and future threats

Finally, the National Military Strategy relies on balance as a key for hedging "against the unknown."⁷⁸ Balance infers an organization that is flexible in its capabilities and structure. The National Military Strategy states that: "Combat forces must be balanced with capable supporting forces, active duty forces must be balanced with appropriate Reserve capabilities, and force structure must be balanced with infrastructure."⁷⁹ Unfortunately for the National Military Strategy this statement is unsupportable by the current BUR force. The QDR may further exasperate the problem

of balance among active and reserve forces, and between combat and support forces if reductions are made happenstance.

The QDR has the potential to invalidate the National Military Strategy's guidance to defense planners. The two MRC scenario is a sizing function dictated in the National Military Strategy and provides force designers a "mark on the wall" to determine force structure. What if this premise is based on false "Cold War" logic? Instead of designing a force that has the capabilities to meet the requirements as outlined in both the National Security and Military Strategy, the QDR may rely on the past logic and base structure on a sizing function that is myopic in nature and fails to achieve either its conventional or nonconventional missions. As the earlier discussion on the QDR suggests, we may end up with a military force structure that is smaller and highly lethal, but irrelevant as a tool of foreign policy. Regardless of the QDR's results, the current force structure cannot meet the requirements outlined in the National Military Strategy. If the QDR dictates a change in force structure the National Guard may hold the key for an already personnel "strapped" active component.

The National Guard Dilemma

The historical background for the establishment and constitutionality of the National Guard provided the framework for discussing the potential realignment of Guard combat forces into support type elements. The BUR force relies on the 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades to augment active component forces in most MRC scenarios. The eight National Guard combat divisions are missionless, other than to provide a "strategic hedge" in a total war environment. The personnel strapped CFP could benefit from a

reorganization of some of the 110,000-man eight combat divisions into CS and CSS type units. As shown earlier, the CFP pool of support forces is heavily dependent on reserve forces as the duration and expansion of the conflict exceeds 75 days (figure 3.1). Focusing Guard resources on this mission would add significant flexibility to the active component if its state role is reduced.

The RAND report indicated that the Guard has the necessary force structure to meet most emergencies. The recent Midwest floodings and the disaster relief provided by the Floridian Guard during Hurricane Andrew highlight the contributions that the Guard can make toward state emergencies. In the last ten years, 1994 saw the greatest use of active duty days for the Guard; and this only equated to 6 % of the total Guard's force.⁸⁰ The few guardsmen required to support state emergencies provides a potential pool of military forces that could be converted into federal type CS and CSS support troops. The Guard has adequate manpower to meet most state emergencies that require low-tech solutions, however emergencies that require specialized training may exceed the Guard's capabilities.

The lack of specialized training punctuates the problems that the Guard experienced during the LA Riots. The historical use of the Guard during the turbulent 60s was met with mixed reviews. Specialized training in law enforcement is a prerequisite for soldiers asked to perform peace enforcement. From the riots in Watts to the unruly protests at Kent State, the Guard performed as expected for civilians without law enforcement training. Converting combat troops into CS and CSS-type units such as Military Police would enable the Guard to support its respective state more efficiently.

From a federal perspective, the converted combat Guard units would have the potential to make a significant impact on defense issues.

Operation Desert Storm is an example of the Guard providing a significant contribution to the active components in their successful operation against Iraq. The success that the Guard achieved was in the arena of support forces. This accomplishment happened before the nearly 1/3 reduction in end-strength in the reserves. The December 1993 "Off-Site" agreement was in response to this changing environment and proposed a restructuring plan aimed at strengthening the roles and readiness of the reserves.⁸¹ The historic "Off-Site" agreement was historic from one major perspective: the active component recognized their dependence on the reserves in an era of drastic force reductions, and the reserves realized that if they are going to be a viable federal reserve they must adapt and reorganized to meet the shortfalls of the active component. The Guard recognizes that they can no longer fend off change as successful as they have in the past.⁸² Change is inevitable and the Guard intends to influence the process.

A recent TRADOC and National Guard study are currently evaluating the possibility of reorganizing the eight combat divisions. The Guard has proposed restructuring two combat divisions into CS/CSS units, adding one Enhanced Readiness Brigade to three combat divisions, three combat divisions remain as-is, and finally, adding two active component divisions with three Enhanced Readiness Brigades under each.⁸³ This proposal exhibits the Guard's adroitness in political maneuvering. By including the active component in the plan, additional flag level positions are added to a force that is facing the elimination of several general officer positions. Offering up only two divisions

from an already excessive force structure is too little to have an effect on the shortages in the two MRC scenario. Politically however, this offer provides the Guard's leadership leverage in the legislative arena. If restructuring is eminent, then the Guard's eight combat divisions hold the key for a smooth and beneficial transition for both state and federal requirements.

Chapter 7

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary:

There are three major conclusions apparent from this analysis on National Guard restructuring. First, the current BUR force is inadequate to meet the goals and objectives of the National Military Strategy; specifically, to fight and win two MRCs. Second, the National Guard possesses adequate manpower to conduct "low-tech" state and federal emergencies that require little or no specialized training. Finally, the National Guard should consider the elimination or reorganization of excess combat force structure into CS or CSS-type units to provide better support to the total force.

As demonstrated by the analysis of the BUR force, there will continue to be shortages in the CFP, both active and reserve, if the Nation must fight two or even a reinforced MRC scenario. The modeling systems used by the RAND study consistently showed a shortage of support personnel to meet the two MRC scenario. This shortage is not only in "raw" aggregate numbers, but it is even more critical among certain MOSs such as Transportation, Quartermaster, Signal and Medical Corps. The "false logic" of the National Military Strategy exasperates these shortages.

The National Military Strategy calls for a balanced, flexible force to meet the emerging challenges in post-Cold War environment. If the current BUR force is based on a sizing function, much as the Cold War force was, then how does designing a force based on old logic meet the numerous nontraditional operations outlined in the National Military Strategy? The sizing function of a two MRC scenario hopefully provides adequate forces

to meet the goals and objectives of the National Military Strategy to thwart aggression and promote stability. Nontraditional operations have the potential to interfere with the military objectives of over-seas presence and power projection. When one adds an actual MRC, the available forces to conduct these nontraditional missions is used up quickly in support of the MRC. The BUR force is adequate to conduct "all other" missions except the two MRC scenario. To accomplish the two MRC scenario the reserves must play a greater role.

The Guard's role as part of the BUR force is to provide 15 Enhancement Readiness Brigades in support of the two MRC scenario.⁸⁴ They provide critical support forces to the CFP at the start of the fight, but the quality and quantity of those reserves become suspect as the conflict expands. The previous analysis indicated that the Guard has adequate manpower to conduct its states' requirements. As long as the missions require "low-tech" solutions, the Guard is prepared to support any emergency. If the crisis requires specialized training, like law enforcement skills during the LA Riots, then the Guard will require augmentation. Overall, the Guard is equipped to meet their respective states' needs. In fact, the use of Guard personnel on state level emergencies is so limited, that there exists an untapped pool of forces to augment the CFP with critical support forces. This pool resides primarily in the eight National Guard combat divisions.

Over 110,000 spaces reside among the eight combat divisions (See Table 1-1). In Figure 3, the chart graphically portrays a 100,000 shortfall in CFP personnel in support of a reinforced or two MRC scenario that is greater than M+150 days. The GAO report indicated that the BUR force does not require the eight combat divisions to accomplish

their missions. So, a pool of over 100,000 soldiers has the mission to act as a “hedge” against future strategic threats against America or to act as occupational forces after a major conflict. With this mission statement the eight combat divisions will contribute little to the national defense.

Recommendations:

In summation, there are two basic recommendations. First, there is a demonstrated requirement to reorganize the National Guard’s eight combat divisions into CS and CSS-type units. The lack of a true mission for these divisions and the shortage of support personnel in the CFP equals the total spaces in the eight combat divisions, a partial reorganization, as proposed by the Guard Bureau, is inadequate. To meet the two scenario MRC requirements the CFP must be expanded. The active component’s strength is currently at historic lows and with forward presence and the on going nontraditional operations consuming most of the available active manpower, the reserves, specifically the eight combat divisions, must be reorganized to augment the total force.

The political nature of the Guard is sensitive to adjustments and must be considered when restructuring an instrument that has both a state and federal role. For instance, removing all of a state’s infantry troops and converting them into medical units could have a detrimental affect on a state like Washington that has a need for “quantity” versus highly specialized operators to put out forest fires. And when the need arises, such as in Los Angeles or the turbulent times of the 60’s, the states’ Governors need the flexibility to augment the police force with some combat troops to restore order (albeit Military Police units are better substitutes for Artillery Brigades). If the 110,000 spaces in

the eight combat divisions are managed properly, a more flexible force could be established that meets both local and federal requirements.

Secondly, the National Military Strategy must reflect reality. Maintaining the “false” logic of the Cold War era only perpetuates the myth of the two war scenario. The French after their successes during the Great War led them to develop a national strategy and defense force based on the wrong lessons from that war. They developed a defensive mindset and force structure and plan that was structured around a static defense (Maginot Line).⁸⁵ If the QDR is successful in breaking the paradigms of the past, than a defense force based on needs of the nation’s strategic interests can be developed. If the National Military Strategy remains unchanged, than the “baggage” of the Cold War will continue to constrained the thinking and capabilities of the nation’s defense forces.

In this author’s opinion, the optimal solution in the face of drastic budget cutbacks and the ever changing threat environment, would be to reorganize the National Guard’s eight combat divisions into CS and CSS-type units. This would allow the current force structure to achieve the ability to fight and win two MRCs if necessary and provide the Guard a viable and meaningful role in the nation’s defense. The reality of two MRCs is extremely remote, but the additional force structure in the CFP and reserve support units, would enable the defense forces to meet the rising nontraditional missions without impeding on our nation’s ability to defend her strategic interests if threatened.

ENDNOTES:

¹ General (Ret.) Gordon R. Sullivan, "Limited Options Will Lose Wars," *Los Angeles Times* (26 January, 1997), M5.

² Larry Grossman, "Col. John A. Warden II: Air Force Veteran Battles for New World Order," *Government Executive* (February 1992), 46.

³ Leslie Lewis, C. Robert Roll, and John D. Mayer, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Assessment of Policies and Practices for Implementing the Total Force Policy* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1992), 20.

⁴ Congress, Senate, Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut speaking for the *Lieberman Defense Amendment* that calls for major review of Armed Forces and Defense Strategy; creates Nonpartisan National Defense Panel to conduct "Out-Of-The-Box" study of future defense needs, 123rd Congress., 25 June, 1996.

⁵ Ronald E. Sortor, *Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Contingencies* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1995), xi.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁷ *Ibid.*, xi.

⁸ Robert L. Goldich, *CRS Report for Congress. Army Reserve Components: Current Issues For Congress* (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 1996), 2.

⁹ US Constitution, Article 1, 88, clause12.

¹⁰ GAO, *Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions* (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, 1995), 3.

¹¹ Sean Naylor, "Two wars, two opinions," *Army Times* (20 January 1997), 3. In this short article, Generals Fogleman and Reimer take opposite points of view concerning the two MRC scenario. Fogleman sees a "one and a half" MRC strategy while Reimer echoed former Defense Secretary Perry's opinion that a potential war in Korea and the Middle East meant that the nation could not relax its focus on a two-war scenario. At stake is the budget's focus. One for more lift capability to flew to many smaller "Bosnia" type scenarios, or one that focuses on another *Operation Desert Storm* requiring costly force structure.

¹² James W. Crawley, "Pentagon plans for 21st century," *San Diego Union-Tribune* (24 January 1997), 8. This article alludes to the potential of the Army losing a couple of divisions, the Navy maintaining about 350 ships, and the Air Force losing three wings. The planning assumptions for the two MRC scenario could become invalid if these reductions are forthcoming.

¹³ Sortor, 12,16,17. This table is a composite of three separate tables.

¹⁴ Ibid., 13.

¹⁵ Letter, LTG Herbert R. Temple, Jr., Chief, National Guard Bureau, to Senators Wendell H. Ford and Christopher S. Bond, 23 June 1989.

¹⁶ C. Warren Hollister, *Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions* (Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, 1962), 25-26.

¹⁷ Army National Guard. *Fiscal Year 1997: Posture Statement* (Washington, DC: Research and Staff Supporting Office, 1997), 1.

¹⁸ Major General Raymond F. Rees, "The National Guard's Very Existence Is Rooted in the US Constitution," *National Guard* (January 1994), 48.

¹⁹ Alexander Hamilton, Madison, James, and Jay, John. *The Federalist Papers* (New York, NY: Bantam, 1982), xi.

²⁰ Ibid., 119.

²¹ Ibid., 121. Hamilton argues in this paper that providing for the common defense via a standing army would provide security for all without placing undo hardships on any particular state. For instance, New York or Georgia would have to provide a much larger force due to their size. The next fear is that a large militia in the hands of a few could threaten the sovereignty of neighboring states.

²² Ibid., xii. Elbridge Gerry, as a hapless defender of the old system, became known as antifederalist; or as he liked to phrase it, "Ratifiers" and "Anti-Ratifiers," or Rats and Anti-Rats!

²³ Ibid., xi.

²⁴ US Constitution, Article I, Section 8.

²⁵ US Constitution, Amendment II.

²⁶ The Army National Guard, A-1 - A-3.

²⁷ Ibid., A-3.

²⁸ LaVern E. Weber, *Active Army Orientation Course: Book 4, National Guard Information Papers* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, undated), Slide 15.

²⁹ GAO Report, 28, 29.

³⁰ Ibid., 30, Table 2.1.

³¹ Sortor, 53. This Figure reflects the short-fall with a one MRC scenario in South West Asia requiring reinforcements up to 8 1/2 divisions (remember *Operation Desert Storm* used over 7 1/2 army division equivalents and the total force deployed is almost equal to the current strength of the Army).

³² Ibid., 47, 52-61.

³³ Ibid., 20, 23-25. The FASTALS is considered over-inflated by most analysts. Two other methods are also used called Zero Base methodology and Mobility Requirements Study (MRS). The Zero Based methodology lowers the support force requirement to 136,000 and MRS is 157,000. As discussed later on, these numbers are still higher than what are available in the AC and also have the same problem as FASTALS; shortages of critical MOS in the CFP do not match-up with the requirements for all methods for determining support force requirements.

³⁴ Ibid., 55.

³⁵ Ibid., 62-65.

³⁶ William J. Perry, "Reserve components and the real world," *Defense Issues* vol. 11, no. 8 <<http://www.dtic.mil/defenseink/pubs/di96/di1108.htm>> (7 Feb. 1996), 4.

³⁷ Lieutenant General Edward D. Baca, "A Professional Military of Military Professionals," *National Guard* (April 1996), 30.

³⁸ The National Guard, *Fiscal Year 1997: Posture Statement*, 1.

³⁹ Office of the Special Consultant to the Secretary of the Army, *Bicentennial Of The United States Constitution - A Resource Guide: Supplement II: 1989* (Washington, DC: Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 1989), 22.

⁴⁰ Colonel (ret) W.D. McGlasson, "From Watts To Kent State," *National Guard* (May 1991), 20.

⁴¹ Ibid., 17. The Alabama Guard epitomizes the racial over-tones of this period. They seemed to be constantly in the "firing lines" without any serious incident such as that at Kent State.

⁴² Ibid., 17.

⁴³ US Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clause 14, and Article IV, Section 4.

⁴⁴ McGlasson, 19.

⁴⁵ The White House, *A National Security Of Engagement And Enlargement* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 25.

⁴⁶ William Mendel, "Combat In Cities: The LA Riots And Operation Rio," *Foreign Military Studies Office* <<http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/lic/pubs/rio.htm>> (July 1996), 1.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 2. Then chair of a citizen's commission concerning the Police Department, Warren Christopher recommended to Mayor Bradley to call for federal troops because the "National Guard was very slow to move in and that's fairly typical too. The National Guard is not very effective in these situations."

⁵⁰ NGAUS, *GAO Report: Army National Guard Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and Size Those Forces Accordingly* (Washington, DC: National Guard Association of the United States, undated), <<http://www.ngaus.org/gao31696.html>>, 4.

⁵¹ Ibid., 4.

⁵² _____, "Lessons Learned from Desert Storm: The Guard Has Proven It Is America's Asset," *National Guard* (January 1992), 40.

⁵³ Major General Raymond F. Rees, "The Largest Mobilization In 30 Years," *Army* (October 1991), 111.

⁵⁴ Sorter, 78.

⁵⁵ GAO Report, 33.

⁵⁶ Major General John L. Matthews, "A Force Structure Solution We Can Support," *National Guard* (January 1994), 2.

⁵⁷ GAO Report, 3.

⁵⁸ GAO Report, 4.

⁵⁹ NGAUS, 5.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 2. There is no mention of the eight combat divisions in the National Guard contributing any significant manpower other than remaining as the Nation's "strategic reserve" to hedge against some unforeseen requirement. The statement is probably more political than required. A National Guard combat division is expected to take up to one year to prepare for deployment. Historically, units in WW II were able to assemble a prepare for deployment within a year without a Guard divisional structure in place.

⁶¹ Sorter, 48.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 1.

⁶³ Naylor, 3.

⁶⁴ Charles S. Robb, "Be Ready for Two Desert Storms," *Washington Post* (15 January, 1997), 19.

⁶⁵ Ed Offley, "Military conference warns of coming budget cuts," *Seattle-Post Intelligencer* (24 January 1997), 11.

⁶⁶ Colonel Jim Dubik, "The New Logic," *Armed Forces Journal International* (January 1997), 42.

⁶⁷ Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 744. This strategy was outlined in the US 1954 "New Look" that relied more on nuclear deterrence at the expense of the conventional forces. This policy may have contributed to the unpreparedness the Army was at the beginning of the Vietnam conflict.

⁶⁸ Dubik, 44. This article by Colonel Dubik was recognized by General Reimer, current Chief-of-Staff of the Army, as prophetic and worthy of future discussion. Published in General Reimer's "Thoughts Willing Running" E-MAIL series.

⁶⁹ James J. Schneider, *Theoretical Paper No. 4: Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1991), 24.

⁷⁰ Department of Defense, *National Military Strategy* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), Preface.

⁷¹ Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment* (Washington, DC: Defense Budget Project, 1994), i.

⁷² Matthew Cooper, *The German Army: 1933-1945* (Chelsea, MI: Scarborough House/Publishers, 1978), 128.

⁷³ Krepinevich, 32.

⁷⁴ Ibid., ii.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 15.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 17.

⁷⁷ Brigadier General J.D. Hittle, "Jomini And His Summary Of The Art Of War" *Roots of Strategy: Book 2* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), 473.

⁷⁸ *National Military Strategy*, 19.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 19.

⁸⁰ NGAUS, 4.

⁸¹ The Army National Guard. 3.

⁸² _____, "What Has NGAUS Done For You Lately? The NGAUS Fights to Protect National Guard Benefits and Force Structure," *National Guard* (April 1996), 60-65. This article depicts the numerous occasions when the NGAUS lobbying group and other influential Guard supporters successfully persuaded congress to postpone and in some cases completely defeat bills and amendments aimed at reducing the Guard's structure and influence.

⁸³ Army National Guard Brief, *Army National Guard Division Redesign* (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, undated), Slide 8.

⁸⁴ GAO, 9.

⁸⁵ Cooper, 215. Cooper argues that the defeat of the Allies in France during the German's May-June 1940 Western Campaign was not the result of superior tactics or equipment on the German side, but rather the mistaken lessons that the French clung to from the deadlock of the First World War; static defenses that featured frontal attacks and massive fire power. The concept of decisive maneuver and the indirect approach were considered unattainable by First World War I standards. This influenced the French's organization and equipment. Reliance on "*Levee en Masse*" to defeat any attack on the Homeland versus a professionally trained army that could conduct complex offensive operations was neglected. The building of static defenses on the forward edge of the nation manned by poorly trained soldiers (how much training is required to aim a rifle behind a wall?) under the belief that holding terrain through impenetrable defenses, such as the Maginot Line, would be successful. Building on Clausewitz's assertion that the defense is the stronger form of war, but forgetting that Clausewitz also stated that it had negative aims and should only be used to build-up to take offensive operations.

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